These “sprouts” exist from the beginning, inside the human beings, but it is necessary to cultivate and nourish them, so they can get expressed and develop as virtues. To be able to focus on this process, it is important for human beings to have a proper environment to fulfil their physical needs, their ethical education and their individual effort.[4] 

            “If a person can bring these impulses to fulfilment, they will be adequate to bring all the four quarters[5] under his protection. But if a person fails to develop these senses, he will fail even to serve his own parents.”[6]

            For Mencius human beings are fundamentally similar and what makes them distinctively human is their active potential for goodness. The moral development is for the philosopher a natural process, deriving from the proclivities that are universal, unlearned and purely disinterested. By causing the “sprouts” to grow and be fulfilled, one brings a release of energy, which is “like a fire beginning to burn or a spring finding an outlet”. Therefore, the qi[7] (vital energy 氣) is both a psychophysical and moral energy, and his cultivation produces pleasure and state of well-being. This positive, optimistic, view of human nature doesn’t blind Mencius about the fact that people make bad choices. For these mistakes, he uses the role of the xin (heart-mind心), which is the agency of deliberation that weights the choices and the alternatives, and chooses the major over the minor desires.[8] For Mencius, failing to recognize the sprouts in oneself is to commit violence towards one’s own nature and innate tendencies, and it is the mind who is responsible of focusing, choosing, prioritizing and distinguishing the “greater” parts of the person against the lower parts.[9]

            “The mind is an organ that thinks. If you think you’ll grasp, if you don’t you won’t.”[10] 

            Humans may have the xing (human nature 性), but is the xin (mind) who judges between the beneficial and the harmful, and chooses what way to follow. That means that, even if it is possible to develop the full potentialities of the human constitution, it can happen only if the xin is continually active, judging the relative importance of our appetites and moral impulses. For the prior said the evaluating and prioritizing mind is eventually one of the crucial elements of Mencian conception of human nature.[11] 

            The fact that the xing can be raised only in a healthy environment doesn’t mean that the environment itself is able to produce a good person. Even though human beings have the goodness as an innate tendency, human beings are also open to mistakes, originated by their desires and lack of ethical engagement or guide. Specifically he says: 

            The ears and eyes are organs that do not think; their perception is veiled by things. In this way, one thing encountering another, there is simply a force of attraction. The mind is an organ that thinks. If you think you’ll grasp, if you don’t you won’t. This is a potential endowed in us by Tian. Once a man chooses[12] to stand by his greater parts, his lesser parts cannot seize him. Being a great man is no more than this.[13]

So it seems that, as I. Bloom and A. C. Graham agree, what is distinctive about the Mencian view is the sense of nature as both the way human will naturally develop if nourished, but also the way this human ought to develop.[14]

            Even if there are not sharp differences between the Confucian and the Mencian philosophies, there are some of them that make Mencius a little more “progressive” than his predecessor. There is a common commitment to the idea of the existence of a common humanity (ren and xing), underlying and illuminating the human beings. But, contrary to Confucius, Mencius doesn’t differentiate between the possibilities of the ordinary person and the sage (sheng). He wanted to highlight the common humanity and the morality that stands in all humans, independently of their social condition.[15] Also, it is only in Mencius where we find an elaborate discussion dedicated to the goodness of the human nature; Confucius rarely chooses it as a topic of matter, as his philosophy was aimed to teach to his disciples how to become a proper gentleman. About this differentiation Liu Hisang-shan says: 

            “Confucius spoke of humanity to manifest the Way, and his words were well-rounded and comprehensive. [...] Mencius made the Way transparent so that nothing remained concealed”.[16]

            It is also interesting to mention the further etymological discussion around the Mencian philosophy of the human nature. It seems important to understand that in the pre-Han usage, the term xing (性, ideogram constituted by the signifier “heart” xin忄and the ideogram sheng生), understood as “nature” or “human nature” (ren xing), was not distinguished from the word sheng (生), which alone means “generation”, “growth”, or “life”. Roger T. Ames suggests that the translation of ren-xing as “human nature” is problematic because it makes the xing been perceived as “given” and static, when it actually is a dynamic, achieved concept. Xing is a relational term (human beings are characterized by their responsiveness to others), a “creative act”, and an inspirational concept, which implies the creativity and singularity of each person to develop it. This perception of the xing is the answer to the individualists, who taught that one should keep one’s xing intact and protect one’s genuineness, and not involve oneself in risk to the body for sake of other things.[17] The dynamic and active aspect of xing, also works as an answer to the Mohists, who accused the Confucians of fatalism. Mencius denies that xing is to be understood as ming (fate, destiny命)[18] because he wants people to avoid not making any moral effort. His point is that when one understands what is the course of the proper life, one is able to establish his own destiny.[19]

Gaozi告子

            Gaozi was a senior disciple contemporary to Mencius, with who debates about the human nature and the origin of the rightness in the 6th Book of the Mengzi. In their opening arguments (6A:1-4) there are essentially four rounds. In the first, Gaozi suggests with his analogy: 6A:1 “Drawing humanity and right from human nature is like making cups and bowls from willow wood”, and Mencius answers saying that humaneness (ren) and rightness (i) derive from the xing (human nature) itself and not from artificial distortions of the it. [20]  In the second phase Mencius explains that the xing is not directionless but is directed toward goodness unless forcefully deflected from it. He answers to the Gaozi’s analogy of the human nature as the water in a wellspring: 6A:2 “Human nature makes no distinction between good and bad, just as water makes no distinction between east and west”[21]. In the third round, Mencius counters Gaozi’s assertion that “The term ‘nature’ simply means ‘inborn’”, and questions if the ox’s xing is the same with the man’s xing. The fourth and last round is the longest, and is focused on the nature of humaneness and rightness, and if the latter is external or internal. 

            Gaozi represents the more traditional and simpler philosophical view by saying that human nature is constituted just by the “appetite for food and sex” and saying that humaneness is internal and rightness is external. This means that the xing is neither good nor not-good, but it becomes right or not depending on the external circumstances. As the traditional voice, he approaches the term xing, with the pre-Han meaning with both meanings of “nature” and “growth”. Mencius, on the other hand, even if he agrees with this generic view, he disagrees with this “narrow biological” view. He perceives those human aspects as more complex and adds to the meaning of xing something more than a simple physiological desire.[22] This doesn’t mean that Gaozi makes a mistake, but he simply is unable to see that “something else” that is “innately human” and distinguishes human beings from animals; those four moral “sprouts”, beyond hunger, sexual desire and drive for survival, and the sensitive mind-heart (xin), that make human beings humans.[23]

 David Hume

            Thinking about Mencius and his Confucian philosophy, it could sounds strange to compare it or find any similarities with the Western Ethics, and more specifically to the approach of the modern philosophers, like is David Hume. But, as difficult as it could look, there are quite enough common points between those two distant in time and space philosophers. Hume’s moral philosophy is focused on the investigation of the origin of basic moral ideas; ideas, which he thinks, guide the whole moral behaviour. He assumes such ideas are goodness and badness, as he tries to explain the ideas as economically as possible in terms of their “simplest and fewest causes”, and, following the sentimentalist perception, he believes that sentiments of approval and disapproval are the source of the two basic moral ideas mentioned before. In his Ethics, there are two syllogistic phases; the first is the critical phase, where he discusses his opponents’ ideas, and the second phase, the constructive, where he develops his sentimentalist approach.

            In the Treatise he provides a naturalistic explanation of moral sentiments and refers to them as feelings of approval or disapproval, praise or blame, esteem or contempt; approval is a kind of pleasant or agreeable feeling, and disapproval is painful or disagreeable. He describes them also as calm forms of love and hatred and explains that when we evaluate our own character traits, pride and humility replace love and hatred. Trying to find the point of meeting of the sentiments, he claims that sympathy is the one, where different levels of human behaviour and feelings get involved. Sympathy is for Hume the sentiment that enables to enter into the feelings of anyone, because we all are similar and have “something” that makes us one kind. [24] Morality, on the other hand, is “every quality of the mind, which is useful or agreeable to the person or to others, communicates a pleasure to the spectator, engages his esteem, and is admitted under the honourable denomination of virtue or merit”.[25] 

            The sensibility theory provides a particular naturalistic moral realism, which combines and harmonizes subjectivity and objectivity on a realist ground. In this moral field is where Mencius and Hume find a common ground. They both share essential features in their philosophies and have some complementary aspects. Mencius insists on that moral qualities are as real as the secondary sensorial qualities, comparing that xin enjoyment of moral qualities to the eye’s and other senses’ enjoyment of their objects. Hume, as well, says that “vice and virtue [...] may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and cold”[26]. Both of human qualities are tied to certain human sensibilities, both values and colours are response-dependent, subjective, yet objectively grounded. He suggests that even the beauty and deformity are not qualities of the objects, but they belong to a sentiment, which those objects have the ability to produce.[27] 

            Mencius also claims that in the universe are divided by natural kinds (lei), and all member of a kind share the same defining principle. For human beings, this principle is the capacity for humanity (ren), and the actualization of human nature is this humanity, which consists of some particular cultivated and consistent affective states. Hume, on the other hand, claims that language would be unintelligible to humans without a reference to an existent human nature, so he accents the importance of the common sentiments of human nature. For both Mencius and Hume the kinds of feeling and sentiments are the manifestation of human nature itself, and they are part of an unified kind, the “extensive sympathy with mankind” or “the sentiment of humanity”, for Hume, and the “ren” and the “four sprouts” in Mencius. They also mention the basic feelings of pleasure, displeasure, shame and dislike, although Hume doesn’t talk about the feeling of reverence and respect, which Mencius does, logically as a representative of the Chinese traditional Confucian philosophy, as distinguished morality from the European. 

            Regarding those who are not able to follow the ethical-moral behaviour, Mencius and Hume agree on two reasons of this situation: the lack of  proper education, training and cultivation- which are necessary even the human beings are already predisposed for be moral; and, mentioning the words of Hume, some people maybe simply be mad or ill, and this situation of theirs, can destroy their capacity of humanity or benevolence. Therefore, it is certain that both take humanity and benevolence to be the most powerful feature of the human mind. [28]

Conclusion

            The moral philosophy of Mencius, is mainly and essentially focused in the definition of the human nature (xing) and the four ethical sprouts, which are the innate tendencies that exist and have to be nourished and cultivated in order to make people able to evolve into proper virtues. The mind-heart (xin), is the one who guides these tendencies to the rightness, with the help of a proper environment and education. Gaozi, being Mencius’ senior disciple, represents the traditional and simpler view of the human nature and moral with whom Mencius disputes and questions. Finally, the similarities between the sympathy of Hume’s Ethics, and the humanity of Mencius’s moral philosophy, even representing different periods and civilizations, constitute the intersection of these two distant philosophies.

“But every person possesses nobility within themselves, 

they simply don’t realize it”. [29]

BIBLIOGRAPHY

-       Mencius, Mencius, An Online Teaching Translation, version 1.0, trans. Roberto Eno, (May 2016) (url: http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf).

-       Bloom, Irene., “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (Jen-hsing)”, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), University of Hawai’i Press, pp. 19-53, (url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399803). 

-       Hume, D., A Treatise of Human Nature, reprinted from the Original Edition in three volumes and edited, with an analytical index, by L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) (url: http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/342)

-       Hume, D., Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975) (url: http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341). 

-       Liu, X., “Mencius, Hume, and Sensibility Theory”, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), Unveristy of Hawai’i Press, pp. 75-97 (url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400134).

-       Liu, S., and Shun, K., «Some Reflections on Mencius’ Views of Mind-Heart and Human Nature», Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apr., 1996), University of Hawai’i Press, pp. 143-164 (url: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399402). 

-       Morris, William Edward and Brown, Charlotte R., "David Hume", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (url: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/hume/).

-       Van Norden, Bryan, "Mencius", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (url: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/mencius/).

[1] Bryan Van Norden, "Mencius", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.); Irene Bloom, “Mencian Arguments on Human Nature (Jen-hsing)”, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 44, No. 1 (Jan., 1994), University of Hawai’i Press, pp. 19-53, (available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399803) p. 23, 25; and Shu-hsien Liu and Kwong-loi Shun, «Some Reflections on Mencius’ Views of Mind-Heart and Human Nature», Philosophy East and West, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Apr., 1996),  University of Hawai’i Press, pp. 143-164 (available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1399402), p. 147.

[2] Translated also as “four strings” by A. C. Graham.

[3] Mencius, Mencius, An Online Teaching Translation, version 1.0, trans. Roberto Eno, (May 2016) (url: http://www.indiana.edu/~p374/Mengzi.pdf), p. 109.

[4] Bryan Van Norden, "Mencius", id.; and Irene Bloom, id., p.26

[5] Translated as “Four Seas” by Shu-shien Liu, id., p. 149

[6] Mencius, id., p. 44

[7] Further information: Mencius, id., p.149

[8] Further information: Mencius, id., p. 144.

[9] Irene Bloom, id., pp. 25, 30 40-1.

[10] Mencius, id., p. 113.

[11] Irene Bloom, id., pp. 25-6, 30-1.

[12] Emphasis by me.

[13] Mengzi, id., p.113; another translation of the passage could be: “It is not the function of the ears and eyes to reflect, and they are misled by things. Things interact with things and lead them along. But the function of the heart is to reflect [si]. If it reflects, then it will get it. If it does not reflect, then it will not get it. This is what Heaven has given us. If one first takes one's stand on what is greater, then what is lesser will not be able to snatch it away. This is how to become a great person”, at Van Norden, Bryan W. (trans.), Mengzi: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2008).

[14] Irene Bloom, id., pp. 32-3.

[15] Irene Bloom, id., p.22; and Shu-hsien Liu, id., p.150.

[16] Shu-hsien Liu, id., pp.145-6.

[17] Irene Bloom, id., pp. 24, 27-8.

[18] Mencius, id., p.147.

[19] Irene Bloom, id., p. 24 and 42; and Shu-hsien Liu, id., p. 152.

[20] Mencius, id., p. 107

[21] Mencius, id., p. 107

[22] Shu-hsien Liu, id., p. 153

[23] Irene Bloom, id., pp. 33-35; and Shu-hsien Liu, id., pp. 148-9.

[24] William Edward Morris and Charlotte R. Brown, "David Hume", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) (url: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/hume/).

[25] David Hume, Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed. revised by P. H. Nidditch, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975, (url: http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/341) p. 277.

[26] David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, reprinted from the Original Edition in three volumes and edited, with an analytical index, by L.A. Selby-Bigge, M.A. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1896) (url: http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/342), p. 677

[27] Xiusheng Liu., “Mencius, Hume, and Sensibility Theory”, Philosophy East and West, Vol. 52, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), Unveristy of Hawai’i Press, pp. 75-97 (available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1400134), pp. 75-76.

[28] Id., p.88

[29] Mencius, id., p.113, in version of Shu-shien Liu and Kwong-loi Shun, id., p.147 “All human beings have in themselves what is honorable, It is only that they do not think about it”.