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Introduction

Whitehead wrote once that the best way to describe the European philosophical tradition is by saying that is just a series of commentaries-footnotes of Plato’s words. In the present paper, however, I will talk about a different school and approach that significantly influenced the philosophical exploration, but also further and wider the Western culture: Stoics. Their approach towards philosophy, as well as in regard to the human being and its relationship with the self, its surroundings and life, has given a new shift to the philosophical thought.

Here I will not be mentioning the moral and ethical contribution of the Στοά, neither of the Epicureans or Skeptics, but I have chosen to discuss about their ontology and physics. I want to focus on the importance that the concepts of matter, spirit, somatical and asomatical had for their understanding-perception of reality.

These concepts and the relations between them differ significantly from what was stated and argued by the Ancient Greeks, like Plato or Aristotle; these differences will be presented and discussed as well.

Goal of the present paper is precisely to clarify the value and importance of the ontological and physical background for the understanding of the stoic ethics. In this way it will be possible to valorize also their contribution to ways of view-approaches that appear once again in the contemporary Philosophy only from the 18th century onwards.[1]

Generic

Stoicism as movement belongs, as it is known, to the generic Hellenistic philosophy. With the term “Hellenistic” we mean the Greek and Greco-Roman civilization of the period that starts after the death of Alexander the Great (323 BC) and ends with the defeat of Marc Antonius by the hand of Octavian the 31 BC. During these centuries, of central importance had the movements of Stoicism, Skepticism and Epicureanism, philosophical systems that developed after Aristotle’s legacy. Their activity was not limited to these years only, but it continued to develop and impact during the Roman Empire and the following times, as their philosophy was not limited to a strictly ‘academic’ character and was possible to easily use it by the Christian fathers and the Renaissance scholars. Later one, we find a continuation of their legacy and influence in the names such as Spinoza, Butler, or Kant.[2]

The periodization of the philosophy of the Stoa can be divided in three big sections: the first, that is extended from approximately the year 300 to the end of the 2nd century BC; the middle Stoicism from Panaetius (approx. 180-108 BC) to Posidonius (approx. 135-51 BC); and the late, or Roman, Stoicism during the period from Seneca (4 BC – 65 AC) to Marcus Aurelius (161-180 AC). While from the second half of the 2nd century Stoicism acquired consistent Roman foundations, in Athens the Stoa continued to develop as school until the 129 BC.[3]

In order to understand the philosophy of Stoics and its purposes, is necessary to understand the period in which this school started to outspread. We are situated, on one side, in a period of important intellectual achievements and expansion of the social and political horizons, compared to the context of the classic Ancient Greece. With these changes and the increase of interest towards historical, geographical, and philological questions, there was also a correspondent growth as well in philosophy. On the other side, however, from a social point of view, philosophy finds itself having to confront a period of turbulent and intense historical alterations, and for this reason inevitably its purpose had to adapt, becoming an instrument for the moral and ethical guidance and the definition of a solid identity.[4]

Following the ideas of Diogenes, Stoics supported that the cognitive and physical self-discipline was sufficient for the individual to overcome its fears and passions, and thence to achieve the realization and fulfillment of the self. They were, to this extent, convinced that the inner forces of the human being, the logos, were sufficient basis for the achievement of a joyous and harmonious life.[5] They believed that the truly wise was the person that was be able to attain the moral and mental perfection, namely that which is not influenced by feelings burdened with passion, born from erroneous judgments, and which is able to behave correctly, prioritizing those things that are really important and protecting them from the influence of ephemeral circumstances.[6]

With this attitude Stoicism, along with Epicureanism, was able to be comprehensible to the average person and to offer the satisfactory spiritual and intellectual support that was so much needed. However, this social “service” and “usefulness”, undoubtedly was not a narrow moralism. They would address philosophy as a modus vivendi, a pragmatic way of living (ἄσκησις, askesis) searching and following what was actually right and beneficial for the individual.[7]

The stoic system is known for its coherence and strength, as it is delineated by a hybrid ethical and metaphysical dimension. By the concept of system we mean a combination of items and kinds, or an organized complexity of ideas, which is characterized by comprehensiveness, continuity and economy of concepts.[8] Specifically, the Stoic system is divided into three parts: logic, physics, and ethics. By “logic” they meant everything that included epistemology, semantics, grammar, and syntax, as well as logic as we understand it today. All these elements were connected by reason (λόγον), which is both speech, verbal communication, and the logic of thought, the mental activity.[9]

The subject of research and interest of physics is nature, or φύσις (physis), which includes both the natural world and living beings, such as the divine and holy entities or humans; physics embraces theology itself as well.

Last, ethics are connected, as mentioned above, with the practical application of some essential principles and, insofar as the Stoics dedicated their efforts also to the analysis of moral concepts, and sought the foundations of human happiness, philosophy itself started to acquire this ‘ascetic’ flux and was perceived and treated as “exercise of wisdom”. The fundamental concepts of this philosophical system, then, are reason (λόγος) and nature (φύσις): nature is permeated by reason, and thus all aspects of philosophy are organically intertwined.[10]

Nature and Logos

Κανένα από τα επιμέρους πράγματα δεν μπορεί να υπάρξει παρά μόνο σύμφωνα με την καθολική φύση και τη λογικότητά της (λόγος).[11] [παράθεμα Χρυσίππου]

Η φύση του σύμπαντος έχει εκούσιες κινήσεις, βουλητικές ορμές και ορέξεις, και με αυτές συμφωνούν οι πράξεις της, όπως συμβαίνει και με τον άνθρωπο. [Κικέρων, N.D. 2,58]

By the term φύσις (physis, nature) is defined the power, the principle that forms and creates things; the power or principle that gives the world unity and coherence; the fiery spirit that moves by itself and creates; necessity and impurity, as well as the rational, logical God. For the Stoics Nature is what sustains and preserves the world and makes things on earth grow and develop – a kind of evolutionary life with will and voluntary movement, i.e., endowered with logos (reason). Logos is what sustains the world, God, the soul (or spirit) and mind of the world which constitutes the τεxνικόν πυρ (technical fire). The particular forms that we meet in the world are precisely the manifestations of nature and logos in different categories, which are adapted accordingly to each individual being. As a whole, nature is equivalent to logos, but the latter does not manifest itself in the same way in all existing beings. The proportions and movement between logos and nature differ for each case and kind, generating the plurality of entities, subjects and objects, we discover in our surrounding reality.[12]

The active principle, which is also material, permeates everything and has intelligence. It is identified with God and the human soul constitutes part of it, that is, the fragment of the logical principle that moves the human body. At this point, while in general there is a relative similarity, between Aristotle and the Stoics, we find an important gap. Nature, according to Aristotle, is not an active rational agent, but is limited to the individual organism and is, therefore, not identified with God, who is situated outside of the terrestrial world. In other words, the Stoics unified the separated and disconnected principles, creating an organic and coherent system without gaps, or “imperfect” and “incomplete” beings. Everything is coherent, nature and logos infuse and are found throughout the entire world and each of every individual being, with specific differences and variations according to the individual existence of each entity. Macrocosm and microcosm are not divided here, but have a common, correlated structure.[13]

Matter and Soul

Nature is a kind of body, and by that we mean in Stoics terms that it has existence. Like Chrysippus, the Stoics attributed existence only to bodies because for something to exist it must be able to undergo some change and this can only be done by bodies, three-dimensional objects that actively and physically interact with the rest of the world, and somehow the consequences of time and experience are marked into their material bodies. Existence is closely dependent on the friction between what is considered the subject and its ‘objectual’ and external to it environment. If something does not act on, react to, or in any way is subjected or subjects the ‘other’ (not necessarily meaning the ‘opposite’), how is possible to consider that it ‘is’ and so it ‘exists’? Even the mind, moreover, if it were not something corporeal, could not provoke or act upon humans. In the same way, even feelings, such us virtue or vice, must be necessarily to a certain extent corporeal entities, or at least have some embodied elements, as they can affect us and change even our senses and perception of the world.

Seneca says: matter is inert, something available for anything, and is at rest unless something moves it; the active principle or “cause” of this movement or change is the “reason that shapes the matter and moves it wherever it wants to form from it products of different kinds”. This definition of matter is closer and more similar to the Aristotelian idea of passive matter, i.e., a substrate that needs the (higher) power of another energy in order to become ‘something’.[14] In Stoicism, however, matter is not a completely passive and inert mass, since it is not detached from the morphoplastic principle of logos. Logos (reason) and nature are always interweaved, and so God, the active principle of existence, is also mingled or intertwined with the matter that (s)he/it pervades and forms. The assumption that there are two opposite components, one passive and one active, follows from the dualistic premise that a being exists only if it acts and/or sustains.

It is, however, misleading to call the Stoics “materialists” since the concept of matter is not actually identified with mere corporeality. The body of objects is always an outcome/mixture of both the components: matter and logos. Matter for the Stoics is always steeped in reason and never “dry” passive matter. If logos did not coexist with matter, the body would not be able to really exist, as in order to exist the being must move and change, as stated before. Both these principles are necessary for existence, a balance and interweaving of these elements is what constitute the physical and logical reality as we know it.[15]

As for the spirit, Chrysippus defines it as a carrier of logos, a physical component of the world and an agent capable of rational action. Spirit is the dynamic entity by virtue of which the material objects acts, and therefore exists. The Stoics referred to the sparseness and tenuity of its constitution and structure. The logic of Chrysippus is as follows: since the only element that lasts forever is fire and is able to affect the rest of the elements, ergo this must be the dynamic disposition of matter, the cause of its qualitative variations.

The conceptual distinction between active and passive, logos and matter, is reinforced by the empirical distinction between the so-called active elements (fire-air) and passive elements (earth-water). Still, we must repeat that the energetic element(s) always permeates the matter, and therefore, the active-passive distinction is not absolute, and matter is never completely “deprived” of spirit.

Spirit, as a logical element, intersperses in different proportions in every object, organic or inorganic, thus composing different structures. Each proportion depends on the “intensity” of the spirit in each case, which is determined by its “tone”. That is, the movement of the spirit is tonic, moving simultaneously from and towards itself – similar to a kind of pulse, contraction or vibration that makes it constantly active. This potentially ‘outward’ movement produces quantities and qualities, while the ‘inward’ movement generates unity and substance.[16]

All things in the universe are, then, a mixture, an interweaving, a synthesis of god-spirit and matter, and so from a constitutive point of view, humans are no different from the rest of beings, since all the existing entities, that is the corporeal, have the same principles of logos and matter.[17]

Soul and Body

The soul and the body are both composed of logos and nature, the passive and the active element. In relation to the dualism of Plato, the dualism of Aristotle and the materialism of the Epicureans, the Stoics are closer to the Aristotelian approach. Nevertheless, they differ in the relationship that unites the soul to the body: for Aristotle the soul, although not being immortal, does not exist autonomously, but only at the moment when the body functions; for the Stoics, on the other hand, there is no dualism that consists of a material and immaterial dimension, but two equally elements that are material and indispensable for the physical hypostasis (status) to exist.

The Stoics differentiate between body and soul. The soul is the principle of intellectual life and includes the mental and moral qualities of the person, the human being. The concepts of “identity” and “personality”, therefore, are primarily “logical” and “mental” rather than “physical” properties. This does not make them impassive to possible physical conditions and alterations.[18] Humans are bodies, and since the soul exists, according to the Stoic philosophy, it must be necessarily corporeal as well, because, as mentioned before, only that which is corporeal exists.[19] Existence is matter infused by logos, a material logos or logical matter.

However, although both are physical, they differ in process, in kind. The human being, then, is an animate, rational, and mortal body, affected and influenced by movement, alterations, and time; it is a piece of universal matter permeated by the rational, logical, God.[20]

According to the Stoics there are three kinds of bodies, depending on complexity of their constitution: the διεστώτα/separated, bodies made up of ‘individual’ parts, the συναπτόμενα/conjoined bodies, made up of parts attached together, amalgamated, the ηνωμένα/united, meaning the united bodies, and the σύμφυα/connate, i.e., the living beings that developed together.

However, cohesion is not in alone the principle of life itself, since stones and rocks are “conjoined” but not alive. The difference between a Stone and a living being relies on the fact that, while they are all ‘united’ by the aforementioned “intense movement” or “tonic vibration” of the spirit (πνεύμα), animals and humans are the only ones that have a soul. Therefore, from this point of view, according to the Stoics plants are not animate, despite the fact of their solidity and consistency. Consequently, this coherence should not be misinterpreted with an absolute mixture of elements, but should be considered a harmonious and balanced composition, an actual interweaving of different intensities and tones for each case and entity.[21]

Corporeals and Incorporeals[22]

The Stoic soul, although an active force, does not coincide with what Aristotle defined as κίνησις (motion). The movement of the soul is more of an ‘intensive’ or ‘tonic’ movement of potentiality than a qualitative, quantitative or ‘local’ movement. That is why it is almost impossible to perceive the qualities of the soul with the common criteria of the physical objects, since its movement, this kind of oscillation or pulse, manifests simultaneously inwards and outwards.

As already mentioned before, the corporeal is the fundamental element of the existent being. Something really is, is existent, only if it is corporeal, has body. The Stoics, along with the corporeals - the bodies - as such, introduce into the realm of existence also the incorporeals. In opposition of what some perceive, the incorporeals are not considered inferior to the corporeals in the context of a hierarchy of ‘real existence’. Incorporeals appear as being indispensable for the existence of the corporeals, that is, they are not placed on a subordinate, secondary level, but on a complementary equal one.

Sextus Empiricus refers to four kinds of bodies: words, void, place, and time.

Although some consider that the incorporeal are dependent and sub-existent of the corporeal, Boeri disagrees and considers the incorporeal as equivalent to the bodies, since they are equally necessary for the existence and the constitution of the world. Clement of Alexandria would say that time is a necessary condition for the objective truth, for the material objects and the objective experience and perception of all of them.

Time, although being incorporeal, is indispensable for any process and circumstance that is understood under temporal conditions, that is, that has a certain duration. A process requires a before and an after, a time that measures its movements and changes. Time as incorporeal offers a framework, a context, for the composition of the existent, it is a condition of possibility, even if is not corporeal or material. Here we must restate that only bodies can be affected by change and to provoke it, that is, to be the cause of an effect. Thus, we have the interesting case of incorporeals that influence and affect, are causes, and therefore exist (even though they are not physical or material).

Correspondingly, all bodies, material things also exist in a space.[23] A reasonable question that could be arise here is about the existence of bodies in a space. From the moment that space is related to extent, absence, and presence of objects, and the incorporeal is their absence, where exactly exist the incorporeals? Which is the space or place of existence of the incorporeals? The Stoics introduced the perception of “I am present/am here”. Past and future simply happen and encounter in the present, which is what actually is here and exists. We will see below, anyway, that according to Johnson, there may not be a present and it may simply be the meeting point between the past and the future.

In order to understand the relationship between corporeals and incorporeals, the differentiation between the totality (όλον) and everything (παν) becomes helpful. The world by itself is a whole, a totality, while together with the external void that encloses it and cannot exist without it, they constitute the everything (παν).

Regarding the words, they define the logico-linguistic relations that allow us to identify objects in order to comprehend them. There is, of course, a difference between saying something and the pronouncing or spelling of it. Whilst the sounds are uttered, the objects and states of events are said. In order for something corporeal to acquire meaning for the person, logos, reason, is necessary. That is why words are of main importance for the synthesis and understanding of the meaning of the material real world. Through them, thought and reality are connected, thus giving meaning to the world in which humans exist.[24]

Unlike Plato, the Stoics do not separate existence from nothingness, but make a distinction between something and nothing. Therefore, they give the opportunity for something without a body to actually exist, without meaning that it must be ‘nothing’. On the contrary, Plato and Aristotle did not perceive the possibility of existence of any entity that did not incorporate or had a ‘corporeal not-something’. Corporeals and incorporeals are equally kinds of ‘something’ – real - but only the corporeals actually ‘exist’. To be, the being, means to have a body, and as said, there is no immaterial existence. Deleuze and Spinoza would agree with the Stoics regarding the conception of ‘being’ as the capacity of an entity to act and undergo, sustain, some effect, a characteristic of bodies. Contrary to Boeri, according to Johnson, incorporeals do not exist in the same ways that bodies do, but are subject to the existence of the latter. For something to endure does not mean that it exists nor not exists, but its existence lies between something and nothing. They are simply non-existent realities. The existence of bodies and incorporeals is modally different.[25] The difference is essential for the transformation of the Platonic metaphysical hierarchy, where the Ideas are at the top and the material objects at the bottom. Stoic ontology reaches and synthesizes an ‘ontological’ surface, in which the transfer from bodies to incorporeals happens in a horizontal equal line, and not vertically from a higher level to a lower, inferior, one. In this way, the Stoics introduce a whole new perspective, a new philosophy which, according to Deleuze, is totally a Stoic achievement.[26]

Sectus said:

‘Οι Στωικοί λένε ότι το κενό είναι ό,τι μπορεί να καταληφθεί από ένα υπαρκτό αλλά δεν είναι κατειλημμένο [...] τόπος είναι ό,τι είναι κατειλημμένο από ένα υπαρκτό [σώμα]’.

In the four categories of the incorporeals, Johnson simply combines the concepts of void and place together in a broader idea of space. Place and void are simply two dimensions of the same element: space, and both are incorporeal and cannot be affected by any cause. Place is occupied space and void, emptiness, is empty space. Emptiness exists independently of the bodies and is also eternal and limitless.

The next group of incorporeals are the vocables (λεκτά), the first concept used by the Stoics to refer to language. For them words and sounds are natural elements. A sentence makes reference to a particular situation or event in the world. An interesting example here is the case of death. Death exists only in words, since it is an event expressed through the verb ‘to die’, but without any reference to a specific real, material object or situation. The connection between the physical bodies and the sonant words consists of an incorporeal limit of meaning.

In the same way to the case of death, also all the rest of the events in the world and life, at the moment that they occur, are actually incorporeal. Nouns do express the existence of a situation, but the event itself expressed by a verb, in motion, while happening, never really physically exists. There is no ‘object’ or specific tangible entity that can be referred as ‘event’, as it is a sequence of movements, shifts and actions. We have a beginning, a cause, and an effect, an end, but never the eternally lasting event. The event ‘exists’, flows, on the limit between the inaccessible past and the unapproachable future.

Likewise, death never really exists, as it never arrives or has always already arrived, someone always ‘will die’ or ‘has died’. This impersonal, incorporeal and limitless moment can only be brought to the present, to the now, through suicide, which is why Johnson refers to the suicides of Seneca and Deleuze themselves as symbols of this conscious process.[27]

Regarding time, Aristotle says that it is the ‘number of the transfer with reference of the before and the after’. Zeno says on the other hand that ‘it is the interval of all movement without determinacy’. Both relate time to motion, but Zeno does not do so by quantitative measures or numbering. Time is the dimension of the movement that cannot be reduced to a quantitative measurement. Next, Chrysippus defines time as ‘the dimension of movement that accompanies the movement of the world’. Here we have an evolution of the perception of time, from something intermittent to something continuous, a change that the later Stoics also support. Time, thus, now becomes a continuous and ‘intensive’ element, instead of a quantitative and measurable feature, which is continuous and coherent, following the whole Stoic system.

This new approach towards time changes the concept of the present and expands it. The present now can be eternal and intersect endlessly, without being anymore a concrete present, but a spread and enlarged one. The present ends up consisting of both the past and the future, and like death, incorporeal, never exists. It is not exacly non-existent, but it is simply the incorporeal limit that ceaselessly dissolves into the past and the future. From a different perspective, future and past may not exist by themselves, indipendently, but they might exist under the existence of the general, pervading present. Here, then, we distinguish a difference between the terms of Time (Χρόνος) and Aeon (Αίων)[28], the former as means of time understood in its extensive terms, while the latter in its intensive ones.[29]

In conclusion, in Johnson’s words, the world of reality, of the corporeals and incorporeals, is ultimately a Möbius strip where on one side we have the finite, extended, corporeal elements – place, substance, time; and on the other side we have the endless, intensive, intersecting dimensions – the void, the verbs and the Aeon. Both sides at some – indefinite – point meet and become each other.[30]

Conclusion

So we see, then, how such an ontological shift in the perception of existence manages and changes the entire treatment of reality. The fact that there is no clear separation of matter and logos, but also between corporeals and incorporeal, gives continuity to the perception of the world, of the human being and the relationship between the subject and its environment. We can see also how the coherence that we find here also affects the entire Stoic system, and in general the perception about life and the characteristics of humans. There are no clear boundaries, black/white, yes/no, good/bad, detached one from the other, but one contains and constantly interacts with the other. They are no actual opposites, but intensities of the same fluid spectrum.

In some way, this brings us to mind the concept of the ying-yang forces and the general ‘peace’ with which the self-realized human addresses the things. This balance probably derives from the ability of the person to perceive this continuity and necessity of all beings to be intertwined. There is no underestimation or required ‘choice’ in one direction or another, as long as no direction or level is better than the other. The Stoic sage knows and owns the way to exist in the world. (S)he/it possesses the right way in which to perceive and confront itself, its existence and its relations with the environment.

It is also interesting that this continuity of all the elements of reality, does not appear again until the 18th century and the philosophy of the German Idealists and the process philosophy, of which the Stoics were the ones that had already given the first hint. [31] Βιβλιογραφία

- Αραμπατζής, Γ., Από τη Στοά στο Βυζάντιο, εκδ. Καρδαμίτσα, Αθήνα 2016.

- Baltzly, Dirk, "Stoicism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition), (ed.) Edward N. Zalta, (διαθέσιμο στο https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2019/entries/stoicism).

- Boeri, M. D., “The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals”, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Jun., 2001), pp. 723-752, εκδ. Philosophy Education Society Inc. (διαθέσιμο στο http://www.jstor.org/stable/20131617).

- Johnson, R. J., “On the Surface: The Deleuze-Stoicism Encounter”, Contemporary Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics, εκδ. Edinburgh University Press, 2017. (διαθέσιμο στο https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.3366/j.ctt1g050w8.20).

- Long, A. A., Η Ελληνιστική Φιλοσοφία, μτφρ. Στυλιανός Δημόπουλος και Μυρτώ Δραγώνα-Μονάχου, εκδ. ΜΙΕΤ, Αθήνα 2003.

- Long, A. A., “Soul and Body in Stoicism”, Phronesis, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1982), pp. 34-57, εκδ. BRILL (διαθέσιμο στο http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182138).

- Πλούταρχος, Ηθικά, εκδ. Κάκτος, Αθήνα 1996.

- Seibt, Johanna, "Process Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (διαθέσιμο στο https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2018/entries/process-philosophy).

- Whitehead, A. N., Process and Reality, εκδ. The Free Press 1978.

[1] βλ. Process Philosophy από Seibt, Johanna, "Process Philosophy", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2018 Edition), Edward N. Zalta.

[2] Anthorny A. Long, “Soul and Body in Stoicism”, Phronesis, Vol. 27, No. 1 (1982), pp. 34-57, εκδ. BRILL, σελ. 17, και Anthony A. Long, Η Ελληνιστική Φιλοσοφία, μτφρ. Στυλιανός Δημόπουλος και Μυρτώ Δραγώνα-Μονάχου, εκδ. ΜΙΕΤ, Αθήνα 2003, σελ. 177.

[3] Γεώργιος Αραμπατζής, Από τη Στοά στο Βυζάντιο, εκδ. Καρδαμίτσα, Αθήνα 2016, σελ. 19, και Α. Α. Long, Η Ελληνιστική Φιλοσοφία, ό.π., σελ 188-189.

[4] Anthony A. Long, “Soul and Body in Stoicism”, ό.π., σελ. 18-19

[5] Ό.π., σελ. 20-22

[6] Long, A. Arthur. Long, Η Ελληνιστική Φιλοσοφία, σελ. 182.

[7] Anthony A. Long, “Soul and Body in Stoicism”, ό.π., σελ. 33-35, και Baltzly, Dirk, "Stoicism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2019 Edition).

[8] Γεώργιος Αραμπατζής, Από τη Στοά στο Βυζάντιο, ό.π, σελ. 20-21, 23.

[9] Long, A. Arthur. Long, Η Ελληνιστική Φιλοσοφία, σελ. 194.

[10] Ό.π, σελ. 195-197.

[11] Ό.π, σελ. 237, και Πλούταρχος, Ηθικά, «Περί Στωικών εναντιωμάτων», 1050b, εκδ. Κάκτος, Αθήνα 1996.

[12] Ό.π., σελ. 238-240.

[13] Ό.π., σελ. 240-245.

[14] Ό.π., 246-247.

[15] Ό.π., σελ. 248-49.

[16] Ό.π., 250-252.

[17] Anthony A. Long, “Soul and Body in Stoicism”, ό.π., σελ. 36-37.

[18] Ό.π., σελ. 34-35.

[19] βλ. και σε Marcelo D. Boeri, “The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals”, The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 54, No. 4 (Jun., 2001), pp. 723-752, εκδ. Philosophy Education Society Inc, σελ. 725-6.

[20] Anthony A. Long, “Soul and Body in Stoicism”, ό.π., σελ. 36.

[21] Ό.π., σελ. 37-38.

[22] Although Boeri used the term “bodies”, here the terms σώματα and ασώματα are translated as corporeals and incorporeals, in order to avoid the confusion with the human and animal bodies.

[23] Marcelo D. Boeri, “The Stoics on Bodies and Incorporeals”, ό.π., 727-730.

[24] Ό.π., σελ. 731-34.

[25] Ryan J. Johnson, “On the Surface: The Deleuze-Stoicism Encounter”, Contemporary Encounters with Ancient Metaphysics, εκδ. Edinburgh University Press, 2017, σελ. 271-272.

[26] Ό.π., σελ. 272.

[27] Ό.π., σελ. 273-6.

[28] Meaning here ‘generation’, ‘age’ or ‘a period of time’ from Greek.

[29] Ό.π., σελ. 276-280.

[30] Ό.π., σελ. 283.

[31] Seibt, Johanna, "Process Philosophy”, ό.π.